

Caveat Emptor!
National Oversight and Military Operations in Afghanistan

David P. Auerswald
National War College, Washington, DC

Stephen M. Saideman
McGill University, Montreal, Canada

Michael J. Tierney
College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, VA

Contact address:
Department of Political Science
McGill University
855 Sherbrooke Street West
Montreal, PQ, H3A 2T7
Office: (514) 398-2324
Email: steve.saideman@mcgill.ca,

Paper prepared for delivery at the American Political Science Association annual meeting, Chicago, IL, September 2007. The views expressed here are those of the authors and not the National War College, the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or any other agency of the U.S. government. This is a work in progress. Comments and citations are welcome, but please do not quote directly without the permission.

Acknowledgements: The Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council has funded much of this project, including the very helpful research assistance of Ora Szekeley. Anne Therrien and Jamie Gibson of the Security Defence Forum, a unit of the Directorate of Public Policy within Canada's Department of Defence, have been instrumental in setting up interviews with Canadian officers.

There was far more controversy than usual at the November 2006, North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] summit meeting in Riga. Rather than serving as an opportunity to “bless” a major policy initiative or existing NATO operations, the meeting was more fractious than usual. Member countries disagreed on several issues. Most importantly, NATO members could not agree either to increase troop deployments to Afghanistan or to allow all NATO ground commanders more freedom to operate. While the official summit press releases indicated that progress was made in these negotiations, the situation confronting military commanders in Afghanistan seemed to have remained the same, at least in the short-run: too few troops on the ground and wide variations in what each national troop contingent was allowed to do.

The challenge NATO faces in Afghanistan is useful for thinking about the problems associated with coordinating multilateral military interventions; and particularly the constraints and discretion facing military officers when they conduct stability and reconstruction operations. Consider that there have been multiple missions for NATO members in Afghanistan since the war began in late 2001, under a wide variety of command structures. Operations in Afghanistan have been unilaterally directed but multi-nationally executed in Operation Enduring Freedom [OEF], and multilaterally directed when operating in the International Security Assistance Force [ISAF] under UN and then NATO direction.

The Afghan case is particularly well-suited for an assessment of the degree to which civil-military institutions matter for the discretion of commanders on the ground. We focus on the form of civilian oversight and sanctioning of military commanders on the ground. Both vary with the form of the intervention – unilateral, multilateral, or some combination. They also vary according to the constraints placed on the military commander from his or her home government. It is this latter constraint which motivates the title of this paper. National Caveats – restrictions on what a particular country’s troops can do – have had a large impact on the performance of individual nation’s contingents in Afghanistan, to say nothing of being a point of friction between NATO members.¹

We explore the behavior of the Canadian contingent in OEF and ISAF as a first cut at exploring these issues. We focus on the Canadian experience for several reasons. Canada has played significant roles in each command structure in Afghanistan since early 2002, so we can determine whether and how changes in command structures matter while controlling for the contributing country’s characteristics. Canada’s role in Afghanistan has been non-trivial, both at home and in Afghanistan. Indeed, Canadian contributions have been a central political issue at home, to the point where they have periodically threatened to bring down the current minority government. Finally, and more practically, we have been able to gain access to senior Canadian officers who have served in Afghanistan and/or liaised with the US Central Command [CENTCOM], something not possible with most other NATO members.

¹ Caveats have also bedeviled commanders in Iraq, as even the members of the more narrow coalition of the willing have differing restrictions on what can and cannot be done. Interview with LT General Walter J. Natynczyk on June 4th, 2007. He was seconded to the US III Corps during and after the invasion of Iraq, and was in a position to assess the challenges of multinational collaboration in an essentially unilateral effort. Bremer (2006) mentions the limitations of the Spanish contingent several times in his memoir.

Civil-Military Relations in Multilateral Operations

The question of discretion in military operations is central to the civil-military relations literature.² How much room do officers have to operate? How much involvement by civilians is appropriate, too much or too little? Elliot Cohen (2002) argues that civilian leaders must take a strong role, not only in choosing generals but in shaping military strategies and operations. Yet the recent experience of micro-management by former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld might suggest that military decisions are best left in the hands of experts. Figuring out where is the boundary between too much or too little civilian input is not the point of this paper. Rather, we seek to understand the degree of discretion officers have in military interventions, particularly multilateral ones. For that, we must turn to the literature on civilian delegation to military commanders.

Principal-Agent Models

We use principal-agency models to focus directly on the problems of delegation and oversight. Principal-agent models explore the conditions under which actors with the authority to make decisions – dubbed the “principal” – delegate authority to a subordinate actor – dubbed the “agent” – to take action on the principal’s behalf. The basic concern explored by the principal-agent literature is that a principal who delegates to an agent no longer has complete control over that agent’s behavior.³ This is true because the agent may not have identical preferences to its principal, the agent may have informational advantages over its principal, and the agent can take actions that are unobserved by the principal. In the realm of military operations, these gaps can be quite significant because of differences in civilian and military ideology, the expertise military officers possess compared to civilians, and the necessity for action by the military agent in far-flung locales. And lest we forget, there are potentially dire consequences whenever military force is used.⁴

We extend this principal-agent approach to multilateral, military operations. Multilateral efforts, such as those in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and elsewhere, are inherently interesting because military agents may have to respond to multiple masters of different sorts: their country’s national command authority and the actor or actors that make the decisions for the coalition or international organization in charge of military activities. Indeed, multilateral military operations can combine a number of different principal-agent relationships.

We have already reviewed the problems associated with standard, *unitary principal’s* interactions with an agent. Principals may have to delegate to agents who have different preferences than do the principals, possess information that the principal does not have – dubbed the problem of hidden information – and finally, can take actions of which the principal is unaware – dubbed the problem of hidden action.

² The literature starts with Huntington (1957) and Janowitz (1960). Feaver (1999) provides an excellent review of the work on civil-military relations. For more recent work on civil-military relations, see also Feaver and Gelpi (2004); Mahnken and Fitzsimonds (2003); and Krebs (2004).

³ This conceptualization is similar to those found in Mirlees (1976); Grossman and Hart (1983); Bergman and Strom (2000); Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991).

⁴ Principal-agent models have been frequently applied to civil-military relations. For examples, see: Janowitz (1960); Avant (1994); Feaver (1998), (1999), (2003); Desch (1999); Zegart (1999); and Stulberg (2005.) For an application of principal-agent theory to other organizations involved in international intervention, see Cooley and Ron (2002), and for an application to U.S. intelligence agencies, see Zegart (2005.)

Collective principals are also common forms of principal-agent relations. Here multiple principals share a single delegation contract with an agent. To put it another way, a group hires an agent, such as when legislators delegate authority to a party leader, or nation-states delegate power to international organizations. In each case, a group of actors reaches a decision among themselves and then the **group negotiates a contract with an agent**. If the group cannot come to a decision *a priori*, they cannot charge the agent with changing the status quo.

A *multiple principal* situation is also possible. Here, multiple actors each form **their own individual delegation contract** with the same agent. An example might be when multiple families separately hire the same real estate agent, or when a national military is beholden to the legislative and executive branches (Avant 1994). No single principal can be assured of the agent's complete loyalty, both because of the inherent problems associated with principal-agent relationships, and because the agent may receive conflicting orders from its many superiors. This can lead to a variety of problems, including incoherent implementation, shirking by the agent, and/or one or more principals not getting their preferred policy (Calvert et al. 1989; Maltzman 1998; Lyne and Tierney 2003). Opportunism is yet another possible byproduct of delegation via multiple principals.⁵ Agents may play the principals against each other and pursue their own preferred course of action.

Finally, there is the possibility of a *hybrid principal*. In a hybrid relationship, there are at least two principals, as is the case in the multiple principal form, each with its own delegation contract to the agent. The hybrid form differs from the standard, multiple principal scenarios in that at least one of the principals is a collective entity, giving the hybrid form some of the same characteristics as the collective principal relationship. The most obvious example of this was U.S. General Wesley Clark during the Kosovo war.⁶ His authority ran from both the U.S. President and from NATO, specifically the North Atlantic Council [NAC].⁷ Thus, Clark faced a *hybrid principal*; one principal was the U.S. and the other was a collective entity (the NAC), each with some authority over his actions. The single principal and all three types of complex principals are depicted in Figure 1.

Insert figure 1 here

Oversight during Military Operations

Principals attempt to control their agents through a variety of means, most of which center around choosing agents whose preference closely align with those of the principal, monitoring the agent's behavior, and sanctioning or rewarding the agent for its behavior. These three solutions are easiest to implement in a unitary principal scenario. In the collective, multiple, or hybrid forms of principal-agent relations, it may be impossible to choose an agent whose preferences align with all principals. In that case each principal will focus on monitoring and/or sanctioning agent behavior. Sanctions associated with erroneous agent behavior can take a number of forms. Principals can fire their agent, promote that agent, alter the agent's portfolio of responsibilities, and/or change the assets under the agent's authority. But since sanctions depend on understanding the degree to which an agent follows the orders of its principal(s), we focus most of our attention on oversight.

⁵ For some of the key works, see Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991); and Epstein and O'Halloran (1999).

⁶ We consider this example more thoroughly in Auerswald, Tierney, and Saideman (2006).

⁷ The NAC consists of the permanent representations (Ambassadors) from each member country.

Principals engage in two primary forms of oversight, dubbed “police patrols” and “fire alarms” by McCubbins and Schwartz (1984). One way to monitor agent compliance is to spend a significant amount of time directly observing that agent’s behavior. In a police patrol, for example, police spend much of their time (and many tax dollars) driving their cars and walking their beats to make sure citizens comply with the law. While this method is very good at deterring and identifying violations, it is quite costly. The alternative is the fire alarm, where there is no action until there is a signal that intervention is required. This is much less expensive, but is essentially reactive, allowing violations to occur before action is taken. It also requires that someone notify the principal that a violation has occurred. In many cases, third parties – such as a concerned outside group or rival agent – are enfranchised into the policy process to monitor the agent. Yet even this solution can be suboptimal if the principal values secrecy or wants to avoid public disclosure of agent actions. In short, neither form of oversight is a perfect solution to the problems of an agent’s hidden information or actions.

The type of civilian oversight of the military is particularly important for operations in a combat zone. Fire-alarm oversight allows military commanders significant discretion within the broad confines of the civil-military delegation contract. As a result, military officers in a fire alarm situation may be more “forward-leaning,” able and willing to engage in a greater variety of operations, even if operations involve risk or are highly politically salient. These commanders can act first and avoid latter sanction from their principal if they have stayed within the broad boundaries of the delegation contract, were successful in the military operation, or obscure a failure such that the principal never hears of the operation. Even though officers in these situations must still try to anticipate their principal’s reactions and stay within the established parameters of the delegation contract, we should still expect much more agent flexibility in these situations.

Police patrol oversight requires that commanders receive approval from their civilian superiors – whether in the field or in the home country – to gain authority to engage in a particular operation. Though we live in an age of instant communications, the process of waiting for civilian approval can take time, which means that those officers who need such permission are likely to be slower to act. Indeed, because the process of asking for permission by its very nature raises the political stakes, commanders may refuse to engage in operations that require permission, even if the likely answer is yes.

With multiple principals, particularly in hybrid situations associated with some multilateral interventions, agents may encounter disparate and simultaneous oversight mechanisms, as each principal is likely to have a preferred oversight mechanism. Not only does this provide commanding officers with potentially conflicting incentives, which can pull operations in different directions, but it also means that subordinate military contingents may face their own form of oversight and constraints that differ from the commander in nominal charge of the operation. For example, subordinate troops supervised with a police patrol oversight mechanism may hesitate to act, while their superior officers are pushing a more activist agenda, being less constrained under a fire alarm oversight system. The converse could also arise, with subordinate troops being willing and able to do more, only to be constrained by their superior officers who are operating under a police-patrol oversight system.

The NATO Mission in Afghanistan

The case of Afghanistan is useful for comparative analysis on the question of oversight. In the past few years, there have been multiple missions under differing patterns of authority. In late 2001, the U.S. led a small coalition of countries under the banner of Operation Enduring Freedom to overthrow the Taliban government and hunt down Al-Qaeda operatives. After the fall of the Taliban, OEF remained an on-going operation that continues to this day. It is largely focused on counter-terrorism, and maintains a U.S. dominant command structure, with countries providing troops under the operational command of the American military. At the end of 2001 in Bonn, Germany, an agreement was negotiated to develop a force, called ISAF, under the auspices of the United Nations. ISAF would provide security in and around Kabul. ISAF eventually became a NATO mission with military contributions from a number of NATO members (Maloney 2003, 10). The original UN mandate allowed for the possibility of ISAF spreading its coverage beyond Kabul, and this is indeed what happened after UN Security Council Resolution 1510 was passed in October 2003. The mission's expansion occurred in a series of steps between 2005 and 2006 (Figure 2).

Insert Figure 2 here

ISAF and OEF continue to co-exist, with the former focused on counter-insurgency and the latter on counter-terrorism, yet that distinction can become very blurred, very quickly. Countries might operate under different chains of command (ISAF or OEF) but largely engage in the same enterprise. Regardless of the command, Afghanistan requires operating in a difficult environment against serious opposition. It is much more fraught with peril than is peacekeeping in Bosnia or Kosovo. Indeed, countries that had signed up for ISAF have found themselves in an increasingly hostile environment. Their reactions to that environment have varied tremendously.

In any NATO activity, countries can contribute as much or as little as they want. This is true even when Article V of the NATO treaty is invoked; an attack upon one is considered as an attack upon all members, but each country decides for itself what to contribute to alliance defense. Once a NATO mission has been deployed, countries can still restrict what their contingents can do, even as they are put under the operational command of other countries. These are called caveats. For instance, during the Kosovo campaign, the Canadian general officer in command of the Canadian air contingent would occasionally veto a particular set of targets if he felt that there was not enough effort to mitigate the threat of collateral damage.⁸

Caveats can be official and written or unofficial and unwritten. Examples of unofficial caveats include whether a contingent can engage in night missions⁹ or with whom a contingent can cooperate. At least one country's force was not allowed to participate in missions alongside the troops from an historical rival.¹⁰ While it can happen that a commander might be surprised by a country's unofficial restrictions, senior NATO commanders have usually worked with their

⁸ Interview with Brigadier General Dwight Davies, February 7th, 2007.

⁹ Apparently, the German units in Afghanistan must return to their base before nighttime. While the example of a country not fighting at night was cited by more than one officer, the identity of that country only became clear after talking to a Canadian member of parliament, Claude Bachand of the Bloc Quebecois, who had visited Afghanistan, staying at a German base. Interview with Bachand, March 27th, 2007.

¹⁰ Interview with Lieutenant General Andrew Leslie, March 8th, 2007. Leslie, as a Brigadier General, served as Deputy Commander of ISAF in 2003-2004, and now serves as Chief of Canada's Land Staff and Commander of the Canadian Army.

counter-parts in previous missions so that they know the limitations of most units. Even if well known, working around caveats is “extraordinarily frustrating.”¹¹

NATO anticipated such differences in opinion during Afghan operations, leading to a plan that “was written broadly enough to allow nations to opt in or out of rules of engagement or missions in which the nations did not want or could not legally allow their troops to participate (Beckman 2005, 11).” Still, this has been quite a sore point in alliance relations in Afghanistan. “As Rumsfeld lamented, ‘Different restrictions on national forces make it enormously difficult for commanders to have the flexibility to function (Rupp 2006, 195).’” Given the limited NATO footprint in Afghanistan, any limitation on any of the contingents significantly constrains what can be done by the alliance as a whole. As important, national caveats make it difficult for commanders to anticipate and plan for what can be done with the force at their disposal, which can have tragic consequences.

Insert Figure 3 here

The problem of caveats is complicated by significant variations in the threats faced in the theatre. As figure 3 illustrates, Canada, the UK, the Dutch and the US are largely located in southern and eastern Afghanistan, while the French, Italians, and Germans are responsible for the northern sectors. This division has created strains because, as one Canadian colonel put it, operating in the north is like doing peace-keeping in Bosnia, while the south is much more like Iraq: insurgents, improvised explosive devices, and suicide bombers, all making for a very high risk environment.¹²

One of the most important caveats that seem to be in play is restrictions about where troops can be deployed.¹³ For instance, it has been reported that “It would take an act of parliament before German troops could join in the fight in the south.”¹⁴ When pushed on this issue, French, German, and Italian leaders say that their forces can be used anywhere in Afghanistan *in extremis*, but that still limits the ability for ISAF commanders to plan, as it is not clear what *in extremis* means. The actual list of restrictions is classified; revealing specific restrictions would reveal each nation’s rules of engagement, which might give the enemy an advantage. Despite such restrictions, Canadian officers make clear that the contributions of some countries are highly restricted while others are much less so. This has led to the term “rations-consumers,” suggesting that some contingents are occupying space and using resources, but otherwise not making much of a difference. Canada’s Defense Minister, Gordon O’Connor, has been quite vocal about the varying levels of commitment.¹⁵

These differences in national commitments greatly complicate life for ISAF commanders. Yet as should be expected, innovative commanders have to some extent found strategies to mitigate some of these challenges. First, commanders have developed matrices (spreadsheets) to

¹¹ Interview with LTG Leslie, Ottawa, ON, March 8th, 2007. Indeed, the commanders of countries that are significantly restricted are often very stressed by these limitations—they would like to do more and their units are capable of doing more, but are preventing from doing so by their national command authority.

¹² Interview with Colonel Steve Noonan, January 11th, 2007.

¹³ This is not new as some forces could move around from one Balkan operation to another, while others were restricted to their sector of a particular operation (SFOR, KFOR, or Task Force Fox [Macedonia]).

¹⁴ “Canadians In Intense Battle As Anti-Taliban Operation Heats Up.” *CBC World*, September 8, 2006. <http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2006/09/08/afghan-medusa.html>, Accessed January 26, 2007.

¹⁵ For instance, see “Canada Handling More Than Its Share in Afghanistan: O’Connor.” *CBC News*, September 7, 2006, <http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2006/09/07/nato-reinforcements.html>, accessed January 26, 2007.

identify potential tactical and operational scenarios and what each troop contributing nation can and cannot do.¹⁶ Second, countries with similar restrictions or rules of engagement can and do partner with each other. Countries that worked together in Bosnia continue to work together in the same sectors in Afghanistan. Canada, Britain, the Dutch and the Czechs worked in Multinational Division/Brigade Southwest in Bosnia, and now they work in Afghanistan's Regional Command South.¹⁷ Having worked out conflicting rules of engagement in the past, these countries can operate together more effectively than with units from other countries.¹⁸

Third, NATO commanders often anticipate what each country can do. For example, in 2004 Canadian Brigadier General Jocelyn Lacroix commanded the Kabul Multinational Brigade, with 28 countries providing contingents. To deal with the problem of caveats, he designed three sets of scenarios and asked the commander of each contingent what he or she could bring to bear in each one. In most cases, Lacroix's subordinate commanders called their home countries to work out the permitted responses. Once the responses came back, Lacroix had each commander brief the rest on what their country could and could not do.¹⁹

Fourth, caveats themselves face restrictions. Countries that are too restricted will lose credibility. Australians apparently have a very strong reputation, because when they show up, they do whatever it takes.²⁰ The Germans, on the other hand, have had their reputation undercut by events in Afghanistan. During the Cold War, the German military was seen as an elite, aggressive force. The same is not true today, as Germany is viewed as passive and unreliable as a troop contributor. As the German example makes clear, countries have to be careful about how restrictive are their rules of engagement, as those rules can affect their future credibility. Indeed, Lacroix tried to use the success of the more forward-leaning national contingents to encourage the more restricted units to revise their rules, playing upon their national pride.²¹

Finally, countries that are willing to do more, or are less restricted, appear to have more influence with their fellow alliance members on the ground.²² Influence in a NATO operation has traditionally varied according to how many troops a country contributes. In the Balkans, most policies were usually hammered out first among the QUINT countries—the five largest troop contributing countries—the US, Britain, France, Germany and Italy. Then, these decisions would be passed onto the rest of the NATO allies and then on to other contributors outside of NATO.²³ In Afghanistan, the size of troops is one factor, but it seems to be multiplied by the

¹⁶ This was standard procedure from at least as far back as Bosnia.

¹⁷ The compatibility of these partners was mentioned in interviews with several Canadian officers as well as the former Minister of Defence Bill Graham, April 19th, 2007.

¹⁸ For example, when anticipating a possible riot in Bosnia, the commanders had to work out how to react to Molotov cocktails. The UK experience in Northern Ireland led to a rather soft approach, where they would put out the fire and move on. Another country, un-named in the interview, had a different standard operating procedure—to respond with lethal force. The contingents had to come to a common set of procedures to respond effectively to such situations, interview with Canadian Brigadier General Dennis Tabbernor, current Director General of the Land Reserve and former Chief of Staff for Operations in MND SW, January 11th, 2007.

¹⁹ Interview with Canadian Brigadier General Jocelyn Lacroix, Commandant of the Royal Military College, February 6, 2007.

²⁰ Interview with Canadian Major General Daniel Gosselin, Director General, International Security Policy, January 11, 2007. He was Chief of Staff for Joint Task Force Apollo in 2002.

²¹ Interview with Lacroix.

²² Interview with BG Tabbernor and confirmed by the other interviews.

²³ During Saideman's year on the Joint Staff, he helped to organize a set of QUINT meetings in Washington, DC among three star generals from the respective countries.

contingent's flexibility. Thus, in recent rotations, Canada seems to have more influence in Afghanistan than Germany or France because its troops are in harm's way and are very forward-leaning, willing to do what is asked of them.

*Delegation and Oversight of Canadian Forces*²⁴

Cross-national variation in civilian oversight can tell us much, but examining temporal variation within a single national example can help illuminate how dynamic the civil-military relations of intervention can be. A closer look at the case of Canada is helpful here, as Canadian commanders have had varying degrees of freedom since the advent of hostilities in Afghanistan, in large part due to a combination of changing oversight and delegation schemes.

Insert Table 1, Figure 4 here

Canadian patterns of delegation have fluctuated over time and across the various missions. We focus here on two dimensions—the number of hats worn by each commander and to whom they were reporting. To preview, at times, Canadian generals have had to ask Canadian colonels for permission to use Canadian forces, so that the two key “hats” were worn by different individuals. At other times, the senior Canadian in theater wore both hats. The number of hats correlates, albeit imperfectly, with the intensity of oversight, as dual-hatted commanders had more discretion than those who had to ask lower-ranking officers for permission to use the Canadian soldiers. Moreover, over the course of time, the chain of command into Canada has changed due to the initiatives of a former ISAF commander, giving greater latitude to the commanders in the field. Over the course of the mission, Canada has moved more from mixed systems of oversight to a fire-alarm-like process, with the most recent commanders having the greatest discretion. Before moving on, it is important to note that discretion has also varied in relation to particular types of activities. At the end of this section, we briefly examine the single most relevant caveat, both for operations and domestic politics, facing the Canadian Forces—that of detention.

Early Command and Control

Until recently, Canadian forces operated under a unitary principal-agent form of delegation, even when they were deployed as part of a multilateral effort. The command structure governing Canadian operations abroad specified that whatever the nominal chain of command in the field, Canadian commanders actually answered to Ottawa rather than being under joint command. Commanders from other nations (such as the U.S.) faced the possibility, realized more than a few times, that they would order Canadian troops out on a NATO mission, but have a lower-ranking Canadian officer veto inclusion of Canadian troops in that effort.

Until 2006, Canadian military commanders answered to the Canadian Deputy Chief of Defense (D-CHOD). The D-CHOD and his staff oversaw all Canadian operations abroad. In any delegation contract, the preferences of the principal and the agent rarely align perfectly, and the Canadian situation was no exception. The D-CHOD had many responsibilities besides operations, and little in the way of staff. This could be frustrating to commanders on the ground.

²⁴ This section is based on a series of interviews with senior Canadian officers that served in Bosnia, with CENTCOM, and/or in Afghanistan.

Moreover, the Deputy position appears to have been occupied by someone who had little ground combat experience, such as a Naval (Vice Admiral Maddison) or Air (LTG Dumais) officer.²⁵ Therefore, the individuals running operations at the highest level of command potentially could have little experience, might be slower to act, or might be more conservative compared to their ground commanders. On the other hand, such officers may give more latitude to the ground commander due to their superior expertise.²⁶ In interviews reported below, most officers interviewed saw the commanders back in Ottawa before 2006 as being too conservative, rather than generous with discretion.

How did this translate on the ground in Afghanistan? In the first round of missions, when Canadian forces served as part of American-led Operation Enduring Freedom, the Canadian commanders had very limited discretion and the key constraint was Ottawa, not Washington, DC or Tampa (headquarters of CENTCOM). Specifically, the commanders of Canadian battle groups in Afghanistan in 2002 faced the same rules as bombers and special forces units—that any mission that might risk collateral damage would need to be approved ahead of time. Col. Pat Stogran, commander of Canadian forces in Afghanistan in the first half of 2002, feared that these conditions would dangerously restrict the ability to act when necessary, suggesting that micromanagement from home might create a disaster akin to events in Bosnia and Rwanda.²⁷

When MG Leslie went into Kabul as Deputy Commander of ISAF and as the Canadian contingent commander in 2003,²⁸ a format that he had “vigorously” requested.²⁹ He had the privilege of one-stop shopping—that the guy giving orders as the NATO Deputy Commander also received them as Canadian contingent commander. Still, Leslie had to go back to Ottawa to ask for permission for high risk activities—where there was a significant chance of collateral damage, potential for lethal force, significant casualties, and/or strategic failure.³⁰ Leslie found that approval was almost always granted (except perhaps 2-3% of the time) and often instantaneously. Permission would take longer if the D-CHOD had to consult with the Chief of the Defence Staff and perhaps the Defence Minister.³¹ After Leslie’s tour, the hats were divided, although it is not clear whether his superiors felt he had too much work to do or that too much authority was vested in one individual.³²

²⁵ In an interview with Vice Admiral (ret.) Greg Maddison on June 19th, 2007, he asserted that the branch of service mattered little, since Canada unified its armed services long ago.

²⁶ Interview with LTG Leslie. Again, Maddison disagrees with this generalization as well.

²⁷ Interview with Colonel Pat Stogran, currently Vice-President of the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, April 25th, 2007.

²⁸ General Leslie actually wore three hats: NATO, Canadian and Task Force Kabul commander. For our purposes, the important ones are as NATO Deputy Commander and as Canadian contingent commander.

²⁹ Interview with LTG Leslie. It is important to note that at the same time that Gen. Leslie wore two (plus) hats in Afghanistan, General Beare wore a single hat in Bosnia, commanding a NATO sector but subject to a Canadian Colonel when it came to using Canadian forces. Interview with MG Stuart Beare, Kingston, ON, February 6th, 2007.

³⁰ Strategic failure refers to the possibility of a tactical effort going sour enough that it might undermine the NATO mission and/or the Afghan government. It is important to note that the level of opposition at this time was far less intense than faced by subsequent deployments. The primary foci of the NATO mission at this time were the warlords inside the Afghan government and disarming the various militias. Interview with LTG Leslie.

³¹ The Minister of National Defence at the time, Bill Graham, did not recall having to give permission for any operations during Leslie’s time, interview conducted in Ottawa on April 19th, 2007.

³² However, given that General Beare sought and was denied two hats in Bosnia at the exact same time because of concerns about conflicts of interest, it is likely that the Afghanistan responsibilities were divided not because of the workload but due to suspicions of conflicts of interest. Interview with Col. John Tattersall

In the next rotation, Canadian Brigadier General Lacroix led the NATO effort in Kabul from January to June 2004. Despite his senior position, he operated under a relatively tight leash. Lacroix commanded the overall NATO mission in Kabul, yet any mission that included Canadian forces could be vetoed by a Canadian colonel who commanded the Canadian contingent and cleared his missions through the D-CHOD.³³ Oversight from Ottawa was very tight. This was a particularly sensitive time for Canadian forces in Afghanistan: the opposition Taliban were ramping up activities; and tightly contested elections were about to be held in Canada.³⁴ The intensified efforts by the Taliban meant that the NATO forces had to increase their tempo, engaging in more direct combat operations aimed at capturing individuals and/or seizing weapons caches. This boost in activity was unexpected, and “not what people had signed on to do.”³⁵ This meant that most, if not all, contributing countries had to go back to their home headquarters to figure out what they could and could not do in their new environment. Canada was among the slowest to respond.³⁶ On a few occasions, Lacroix had to face the galling situation of having to find an alternative to the Canadian contingent when developing an operation since he could not get permission in time.

Even Lacroix’s own travels were subject to strict oversight. He sought to move around Afghanistan beyond the immediate Kabul vicinity, but the D-CHOD was uncomfortable with this activity.³⁷ The best example of this was when BG Lacroix sought to leave the area to go to a meeting. The point of tension was over how he should get to the meeting—in an armored vehicle or a sports utility vehicle. His Canadian superiors preferred that he take the former and he preferred the latter since it conveyed a different message to those he was about to meet.³⁸ When faced with decisions that put him between the home office and NATO, Lacroix tended to choose to do what NATO requested if it was, in his estimate, the right thing to do, taking the risk to ruffle a few feathers. To do otherwise would have undermined his credibility and put the mission at risk. He was not penalized for these activities as the mission was successful.³⁹ Further, during most of his time in Afghanistan, his immediate superior in the NATO chain of command was Canadian Rick Hillier. Given the changes he made when he became Chief of the Defence Staff, Hillier obviously had similar opinions about which risks to accept or avoid as Lacroix.

in Ottawa on March 26th, 2007. In an interview, Maddison suggested an additional reason—that other countries might view the double-hatted officer as biased since he might show preferential treatment towards his own contingent.

³³ Interview with BG Lacroix, February 6th, 2007.

³⁴ In an interview with former Prime Minister Paul Martin, March 29th, 2007, he denied that any effort was made to reduce operations or increase oversight during the Canadian election season. Interviews with former defense Ministers (John McCallum and Bill Graham) seem to buttress Martin on this point, as civilian politicians in Ottawa had little involvement with operational planning as a rule.

³⁵ Interview with Lacroix..

³⁶ Today, Canadian officers are unwilling to discuss the caveats or other limitations of their allies. They are sometimes less restrained when discussing their own country.

³⁷ BG Lacroix suggested that the set of folks at National Defence HQ at this time had less operational experience and whose formative years were during the lean 1990s when the Forces faced extreme budgetary pressure—that there was “a culture of risk aversion.”

³⁸ Maddison does not remember this event, and finds it unlikely that he would have micromanaged Lacroix in this way.

³⁹ He moved on to become the Commandant of the Royal Military College and then the Chief of Staff of Canada Command, effective early March in 2007.

Hybrid Principals, Mixed Oversight

As the mission in Afghanistan evolved, Canadian commanders found greater latitude to operate. This was true for two reasons. First, elements of the Canadian force became responsible for both the OEF and ISAF missions, and appeared to operate within a hybrid delegation system. For example, Colonel Steve Noonan led Task Force Afghanistan from August 2005 to March 2006, and was responsible for both OEF and ISAF missions. This allowed him great freedom to operate as he could choose to engage in an operation and then decide under which umbrella it would fall.⁴⁰ When Canadian and coalition objectives conflicted, he felt that he could focus on Canadian objectives since he was not subject to careful direction by either OEF or ISAF. Nor was he hampered by resources to a great degree, as the U.S. provided all the support he required to engage in operations.

Second, the Canadian military appeared to relax their oversight requirements as the operation evolved. Noonan described his discretion as being broad as he had “wide arcs of fire.” The parameters of his delegation contract were very broad; essentially a 1.5 page memo laying out the intent of the Canadian CHOD.⁴¹ He would report back to Ottawa, and notify them of his operations, but he rarely asked for permission before conducting a mission. Indeed, Noonan agreed that oversight was largely of the fire alarm variety.⁴²

Changes in Command and Delegation Contracts

The command relationships within the Canadian military changed with the elevation of General Rick Hillier to the position of Chief of Defense. Hillier had served successfully in two of the most visible Canadian commands in recent years. He had commanded an SFOR Multinational Division in Bosnia in 2000, and had been the ISAF commander in 2004. In both situations, Hillier had to seek permission from a junior Canadian officer holding the “red card” that could be used to veto the use of Canadians in NATO operations. Upon assuming command of Canada’s armed forces, Hillier quickly altered how Canadian forces operate abroad. As the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff put it, they moved “from a staff-centric approach to a more enabled command centered approach.”⁴³ Hillier gave much broader discretion to commanders on the ground. He created the Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command [CEFCOM] to run operations outside of North America, which streamlined the Canadian chain of command and bypassed the D-CHOD. Finally, superior officers sent to Afghanistan would now wear double hats, no longer submitting to junior officers to get permission to use Canadian forces.⁴⁴

With these changes, the oversight system facing Brigadier General Fraser, Colonel Noonan’s replacement, was relaxed even farther.⁴⁵ From February to November 2006, BG Fraser ran not only Canadian forces but those of other countries operating as part of ISAF.⁴⁶

⁴⁰ Interview with Colonel Steve Noonan.

⁴¹ This is significantly shorter than the five to six page memo that MG Leslie had two years earlier.

⁴² Interview with Colonel Steve Noonan.

⁴³ Interview with LTG Natynczyk.

⁴⁴ Interviews with the former Defence Ministers indicate that these changes were intra-military, as the hatting arrangements were below their radar. Indeed, interviews with past DCDS’s Maddison and Dumais and the current Vice Chief of the Defense Staff Natynczyk indicate a strong belief within the Canadian military that these command structures are purely military decisions.

⁴⁵ The move from Colonels to Generals commanding the Canadians in Afghanistan was deliberate, as the mission became more complex and controversial.

⁴⁶ In OEF, Fraser served under an American commander, but also served over a multinational force, including Americans, and his ultimate boss was CENTCOM commander U.S. General John Abizaid. Under ISAF,

This was a critical time. ISAF was expanding its operations to the south, one of the most contested regions in Afghanistan. The Taliban reacted quite strongly to this new effort, leading to a battle, part of Operation Medusa, that Fraser termed NATO's most intense battle ever.

Like Noonan, Fraser operated within both NATO and Canadian parameters but felt that his ultimate marching orders came from the head of Canada's military in Ottawa. During his tour, however, there were not many instances when those orders conflicted. His mission was to help the Afghan government build its capacity to provide for its own security, to include training and supporting the Afghan army while supporting the work of NATO's Provincial Reconstruction Teams [PRT].⁴⁷ Fraser did not feel as if he crossed or even approached the limits of his discretion during his tour. When asked if there was anything that he could not do, he brought up counter-narcotics. NATO has avoided making counter-narcotics part of its key military tasks. NATO forces will support the Afghan government's efforts by providing troops to back up the main effort, as reserves. Otherwise, Fraser was able to engage in operations driven by dynamics on the ground. "Everything I did over there was notification, not approval."⁴⁸

Operation Medusa is the exemplar thus far for both operations on the ground and the politics around them. Over the summer of 2006, the Taliban sought to counter the growing presence of NATO and of the Afghan government in the Kandahar region. For the first time since the creation of ISAF, the Taliban sought to control and keep some ground and sought a conventional battle, hoping to engage in a battle of attrition to undermine the NATO effort and the public support for it in the home countries. It led to the most intense battle since 2002, with significant casualties. Essentially, the Taliban were trying to do to NATO what it did to the Soviets in exactly the same terrain. This battle did become quite visible in the Canadian media because of its intensity—that Canadians were dying and that Canadians were doing some serious killing, a significant departure from past practices in Bosnia, Haiti, Eritrea, Cyprus, etc.

At no time did Fraser face significant restrictions from his home government. While he kept the CHOD staff in Ottawa informed, and they kept the Prime Minister and Defense Minister briefed, Fraser did not feel constrained. Indeed, he asked for a great deal of support and received everything he asked for, including tanks, which was controversial.⁴⁹ So while he interacted with his superior military officers in Canada and with the elements of the Foreign Ministry in Afghanistan (such as the Canadian Ambassador), Fraser was not constrained by the Prime Minister, the Defense Minister or Parliament. They only mattered, if at all, through the Forces HQ in Ottawa.

Fraser served in the NATO chain of command under Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) U.S. General James Jones and more directly the ISAF commander, British General David Richards. Fraser asserted that there was no difference on the ground, in terms of the effects the missions were having in Afghanistan, although the politics were different. In each case, he commanded troops that had varying levels of discretion, some with more extensive caveats than others. Interview with BG Fraser.

⁴⁷ This is rather vague and broad so we are currently trying to nail this down.

⁴⁸ Interview with BG Fraser.

⁴⁹ Fraser also was not constrained by the US, as he received as much intelligence, air support, money, and other resources as he needed.

Canada's Critical Caveat: Detention

We need to consider the key Canadian caveat—detention.⁵⁰ This issue is important for several reasons. First, Canada has had very few caveats in its mission in Afghanistan, so it makes sense to consider at least one of the few key restrictions.⁵¹ Second, this restriction is not new, but actually a consistent limitation when Canada's Forces are deployed. Third, this mini-case points to a major wrinkle in the principal-agent dynamics—that oversight can vary widely not only over time and between missions, but also within a mission between different kinds of activities. Finally, this issue has become a focal point within Canadian politics, leading to calls for the replacement of the Minister of National Defence Gordon O'Connor.

Canada, in its history, has rarely detained combatants. Its current military largely lacks the capacity to lock people up, as people are not trained nor equipped to serve as jailors. As a result, in any mission, if they are to pick people up, Canadian Forces must then do something with them. At first, under Operation Enduring Freedom, the obvious answer was to turn prisoners over to the United States. Over time, as the mission evolved from taking down the Taliban to counter-insurgency and supporting the new Afghan government, the situation became more complex. Should detainees be turned over to the Americans, whose reputation in these matters had taken a nose dive? Or do you turn over prisoners to the sovereign entity that Canada is trying to buttress—the Afghani government, despite a very dark track record on treatment of prisoners?

The Canadians opted for the latter. The basic idea was that Afghanistan was a sovereign country, and the purpose of the mission was to build Afghani capacity. Colonel Steve Noonan Noonan worked closely with the Canadian Ambassador and the Afghans to develop a policy—where detainees would be handed over to the Afghan government, but would be tracked to make sure they were treated in accordance with international standards.⁵² This agreement was signed by General Rick Hillier as Chief of the Defence Staff. The content of this agreement has become subject to much controversy, as Afghans have apparently been beaten after Canadians have turned them over to the local Afghan authorities. While this agreement was worked out under the previous Liberal government, it has become a major problem for the current Conservative government. The relevance here, however, is not the domestic feuding, but rather that this was an issue in which the top of the military hierarchy was not only concerned about, but engaged in considerable oversight throughout the various missions. From the spring of 2002⁵³ to the current day, the military leadership paid considerable attention to this issue, as did the Minister of Defence, at least during Bill Graham's tenure.⁵⁴

Oversight varied over time and across missions, but also varies across activities. The leash controlling operations has been loosened over time, both due to learning and changes in who was doing the monitoring. At the same time, fairly consistent attention has focused on what Canada will not do—detention—and the challenges that this restriction then imposes. And, as it

⁵⁰ In nearly all conversations, Canadian officers do not consider this to be a caveat but rather a limited capability due to the constraints facing Canada's small armed forces.

⁵¹ The other caveat seems to be crowd control—that the Canadians do not do crowd control in Afghanistan or previously in Bosnia. There may be other caveats, but these seem to be the only ones that come up.

⁵² The agreement has a variety of flaws, including dependence on local and international non-governmental organizations to do the monitoring, rather than Canadian officials.

⁵³ As reported in an interview with Colonel Stogran.

⁵⁴ Interview with Bill Graham.

turns out, the senior officers in the military knew what they were doing, as the abuses that have to come to light are a major political issue in Ottawa.

Delegation and Sanctions of Agent Behavior

Operation Medusa was a huge success, as it thwarted the Taliban offensive, proved the capabilities of the NATO force, and supported the Afghan government in its effort to exert authority in the region. But it became a lightning rod in Brussels and Ottawa. The operation gained the attention of SACEUR, of the ambassadors and permanent representations at NATO, and of the Americans.⁵⁵ This led to intra-NATO politicking in the lead up to the 2006 Riga summit about who was contributing in Afghanistan. The intensity of the conflict also was debated by the competing political parties in the Canadian parliament.

We know from principal-agent models that one way of forestalling agent misbehavior is for the principal to threaten punishment for bad behavior. Certainly that possibility existed for Canadian military officers in Afghanistan, had they exceeded their delegation contracts. That does not appear to have occurred. Indeed, despite an intense debate within the Canadian parliament over the wisdom of deployments to Afghanistan, Afghan operations have been an unalloyed success story for the Canadian armed forces.⁵⁶ Serving in Afghanistan has been a boon to the careers of Canadian military officers. No example is clearer than that of General Rick Hillier, who was the first Canadian commander of ISAF and was rewarded by being promoted to be the Chief of Defense Staff, the highest ranking officer in the Canadian military.⁵⁷ Nearly all of the other officers whom we interviewed also moved from their Afghanistan posts to new, more senior positions. LTG Leslie holds one of the most senior positions in the Canadian Forces, as Chief of the Land Staff and Commander of the Army and is widely viewed as a likely future Chief of Defence Staff. Similarly, speculation exists that BG Fraser is slated for one of the most senior positions in the Canadian armed forces.

Another striking feature of Canadian oversight over the effort in Afghanistan is that nearly all of the decisions and dynamics were intra-military. That is, when asking about the role of civilians in oversight, Canada civilians and officers largely concurred that the civilians delegated to the senior military leadership nearly all decisions, except for the decisions to deploy to particular places at particular times. While the civilians pushed the Canadian military into Afghanistan in 2003 (as part of an effort both to help the war against terrorism and to deflect US pressure to help out in Iraq) and helped to make it a NATO mission, how the mission was to be conducted and overseen was up to Canada's Chief of the Defence Staff and his Deputy. Under

⁵⁵ Interview with BG Fraser.

⁵⁶ The officers in the Canadian Forces see this experience as their opportunity to demonstrate that they deserve to sit at the table with the more powerful countries, and have actually exceeded most of them. While France, Germany and Italy have been criticized for refusing to go out at night or out of their sector, Canada has been seen, rightly so, as willing to engage in fierce fighting and successfully making a difference in its sector. Canadians have been willing to die alongside their allies in southern Afghanistan. Moreover, for the Canadian military, this experience is vindication for all the budgetary battles over the past two decades, where Canadian leaders wanted to rely on soft power and peacekeeping done without force.

⁵⁷ The CDS in Canada has a great deal more power than the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the US, where the regional combatant commanders report directly to the Secretary of Defense. In Canada, commanders in the field reported in the past to the Deputy CDS and now to the Commander of CEFCOM, and, in both cases, those generals were directly under the CDS. The CDS is the commander in chief of the Canadian armed forces, although he can be replaced by the Prime Minister.

CDS Henault and DCDS (or D-CHOD) Maddison, officers on the ground in Afghanistan were given less discretion, although their “left and right arcs of fire” became broader as time went on. The decision to double hat Leslie but single hat subsequent commanders laid in Henault’s and Maddison’s hands. When General Hillier replaced Henault, double-hatting became standard procedure and the officers on the ground gained significantly more discretion, allowing them for most activities to beg forgiveness after the operation rather than ask permission beforehand. The key here is not why the Generals had different views about delegation,⁵⁸ but that the delegation contracts changed when there was a change in senior military leadership (Henault and Hillier were both picked by Liberal Prime Ministers), not due to the alternation of parties in power in Ottawa.

In Lieu of Conclusions

The form of oversight confronting a military commander matters, as troops that can act without gaining permission seem to be far more active than those who can act independently. The evidence suggests that variation in military discretion in Afghanistan had much to do with the rules within the Canadian military: the change from single to double hats, the simplification of the chain of command with the standing up of CEFCOM, and changes in oversight. These were clearly the initiatives of a new defense chief.⁵⁹

The form of oversight changed, from restrictive to loose, from police patrols and required permissions to fire alarms and notification after the fact. Currently, Canadian officers in Afghanistan have significant room to operate with robust rules of engagement, even after some of the most intense and costly engagements Canada has experienced since Korea. Canadian leaders have chosen to give their officers significant discretion.⁶⁰

This leads us to wonder as to what shapes discretion? Why do some countries choose restrictive forms of oversight while others give their officers more room to maneuver? At this point we can only speculate. It may be that the Afghanistan environment is so violent and dangerous that some countries are averse to taking risks. Comparing the rules governing European troops (German, French, Italian, Spanish) in Afghanistan and Kosovo might provide

⁵⁸ In various interviews, there are three explanations that are usually offered: that Henault (Air Force) and Maddison (Navy) were not Army officers; that they were of an older and more timid generation of Canadian officers, and that Hillier is representative of the new breed that had to stand by and watch atrocities occur in Bosnia and vowed to be more aggressive in future situations; and that Hillier is a unique individual, unlike most of his predecessors in his willingness to be outspoken and to re-shape the Canadian forces. Thus far, if we had to bet, we would put our money on the second explanation, given the opinions offered by other generals who might also be considered part of the newer generation, and by the repeated focus by Maddison on an earlier and equally traumatic experience for the Canadian military—Somalia.

⁵⁹ Prime Minister Paul Martin chose Rick Hillier on the advice of his defence minister, Bill Graham, because they had similar views at the time for improving the Canadian forces, including increasing jointness of efforts, interview with Martin. Aside from this basic congruence, the details were left to Hillier, confirmed in an interview with Graham.

⁶⁰ There is now some controversy about the role of Canada in Afghanistan as Paul Martin and the Liberal Party, now in opposition, have criticized Prime Minister Harper and the Conservatives for focusing too much on offensive operations and too little on reconstruction and redevelopment. However, the changes in Kandahar and in the activities of the Canadian Forces may have more to do with responding to the Taliban’s strategies than with who is running the Canadian government.

some leverage here.⁶¹ Organizational culture may play a role as some countries perhaps have developed particular patterns of civilian oversight that become embedded within their security communities. On the other hand, it may be that the vagaries of domestic politics have an impact, as European leaders may be facing more pacifist publics who are averse to supporting American ventures in the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq. Again, Canada seemed most restrained during a competitive national election. However, Canada's Forces have much discretion despite a minority government and a controversial mission. Finally, the choice of discretion may be driven by a desire to play a larger role within the alliance.

Afghanistan clearly demonstrates that even in the most multilateral of organizations, what officers can do is greatly shaped by their home country. Nationally established levels of military discretion remain, even when troops come under fire. Understanding why some officers have more leeway than others is very important not just as an academic exercise but for managing current and future wars. Given the relatively small number of NATO forces on the ground in Afghanistan, it is very significant that some contingents are doing far more than others. It may ultimately determine whether NATO succeeds or fails.⁶²

⁶¹ It may be the case that the rules are the same, but the restrictions rarely came into play in the less risky environments of Bosnia and Kosovo. Interview with LTG Leslie.

⁶² Other factors, of course, will have a large impact on events on the ground. They include Pakistani activities across the border and the threat of crime and corruption in the Afghan government.

FIGURES

Figure 1: Types of Agency Relationships




Figure 2: NATO-Led Expansion of ISAF




Figure 3: Division of Responsibilities






Table 1: Commanders and Hats

Officer	Period	Hats	Canadian Boss	Multi Boss	Red Card
MG Gosselin*	Feb 2002-Aug 2002	CA Cont Dep ISAF,	DCDS		Gosselin
MG Leslie*	July 2003-Feb 2004	CA Cont	DCDS	COMISAF	Leslie
LTG Hillier	Feb 2004-Aug 2004	COMISAF COM MNB	DCDS	SACEUR	Col. Tremblay
BG Lacroix*	Jan 2004-June 2004	Kabul	DCDS	COMISAF (Hillier)	Col. Tremblay
BG Semianiw	Feb 2005-Aug 2005	CA Cont	DCDS	COMISAF	Semianiw
Col. Noonan*	Aug 2005-Mar 2006	CA Cont COM RC	DCDS	COMISAF	Noonan
BG Fraser*	Feb 2006-Nov 2006	South, CA Cont COM RC	CEFCOM	COMISAF	Fraser
BG Grant	Nov 2006-present	South, CA Cont	CEFCOM	COMISAF	Grant

* Indicates Officer was interviewed for this project.

DCDS: Deputy Chief of Defence Staff; CEFCOM: Canadian Expeditionary Command; CA Cont refers to Canadian Contingent

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Auerswald, D. 2004. "Explaining Wars of Choice: An Integrated Decision Model of NATO Policy in Kosovo," *International Studies Quarterly*, 48, 3: 631-662.
- Auerswald, David, Stephen M. Saideman and Michael Tierney. 2006. "How to Kill a Military Career: Problem of Delegation in Multilateral and Unilateral Interventions," *Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association*, August 31- September 3, Philadelphia, PA.
- Avant D. 1994. *Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Beckman, Steven A. 2005. "From Assumption to Expansion: Planning and Executing NATO's First Year in Afghanistan at the Strategic Level." US Army War College Research Project. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College.
- Bendor, J., A. Glazer and T. Hammond. 2001. Theories of Delegation. *Annual Reviews of Political Science* 4:235-69.
- Bremer III, L. Paul with Malcolm McConnell. 2006. *My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Calvert, Randall, Mathew McCubbins and Barry Weingast. 1989. A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion. *American Journal of Political Science* 33 (3):588-611.
- Clark, WK. 2002. *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat*. NY: Harpercollins.
- Cohen, Eliot A. 2002. *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime*. New York: Free Press.
- Cooley, Alexander and James Ron. 2002. "The NGO Scramble: Organizational Insecurity and the Political Economy of Transnational Action," *International Security*, 27 (1): 5-39
- Cortell A. and Susan Peterson. 2004. "States, International Organizations, and the Consequences of Delegation," Paper presented at the International Studies Association Meeting in Montreal, Canada.
- Desch, MC. 1999. *Soldiers, States, and Structure: Civilian Control of the Military in a Changing Security Environment*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press.
- Diamond, L. and MF Plattner, eds. 1996. *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press.

- Epstein, David and Sharyn O'Halloran. 1999. *Delegating Powers: A Transaction Costs Approach to Policy Making Under Separate Powers*. Cambridge University Press.
- Fearon, James D. 1999. Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: Selecting Good Types versus Sanctioning Poor Performance. In *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*, Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes and Bernard Manin, eds. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Feaver PD. 1998. Crisis as shirking: an agency theory explanation of the souring of American civil-military relations. *Armed Forces Soc.* 24(3):407-34
- Feaver, PD. 1999. "Civil-Military Relations." *Annual Review of Political Science* 2: 211-241.
- Feaver, PD. 2003. *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Feaver, PD and C Gelpi. 2004. *Choosing Your Battles: American Civil-Military Relations and the Use of Force*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Ferejohn, John. 1999. "Accountability and Authority: Toward a Theory of Political Accountability." In, Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes and Bernard Manin, eds., *Democracy, Accountability and Representation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Grossman, SJ and OD Hart. 1983. "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," *Econometrica*, 51 (1) 7-45.
- Hammond, Thomas H. and Jack H. Knott. 1996. "Who Controls the Bureaucracy? Presidential Power, Congressional Dominance, Legal Constraints and Bureaucratic Autonomy in a Model of Multi-institutional Policy-Making." *Journal of Law, Economics and Organization* 12 (1): 119-166.
- Hawkins, D. and D. Lake, D. Nielson, and MJ Tierney. 2006. *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*. Cambridge University Press.
- Huntington SP. 1957. *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press
- Janowitz M. 1960. *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
- Kiewiet, DR., and M McCubbins. 1991. *The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process*. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press.
- Krebs, Ronald R. 2004. "A School for the Nation?: How Military Service Does Not Build Nations, and How It Might," *International Security*, 28 (4): 85-124.

- Lyne, Mona and Michael Tierney. 2003. "The Politics of Common Agency: Implications for Agent Control with Complex Principals," American Political Science Association Meeting, August 28-31, Philadelphia, PA.
- Lyne, Mona, Daniel Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney. 2006. "Getting the Model Right: Single, Multiple and Collective Principals in Development Aid," in Hawkins et al. *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*, Cambridge University Press.
- Mahnken, Thomas G. and James R. Fitzsimonds. 2003. "Revolutionary Ambivalence: Understanding Officer Attitudes toward Transformation," *International Security*, 28 (2): 112-148.
- Maloney, Sean M. 2003. "The International Security Assistance Force: The Origins of a Stabilization Force." *Canadian Military Journal* (Summer): 3-11.
- _____, "Afghanistan Four Years On: An Assessment," *Parameters* (Autumn 2005): 21-32.
- Maltzman, F. 1998. *Competing Principals*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- McCubbins, M. and T. Schwartz. 1984. "Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms" *American Journal of Political Science*. 28 (1): 165 – 188.
- Mearsheimer, JJ. "The False Promise of International Institutions." *International Security*, 19 (3): 5-49.
- Moe, TM. 1990. "Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story." *Journal of Law, Economics and Organization*, 6: 213-260.
- Nielson, D. and MJ Tierney. 2003. "Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform," *International Organization*, 57 (2): 241-276.
- Nielson, D. and MJ Tierney. 2005. "Theory, Data, and Hypothesis Testing: World Bank Environmental Reform." *International Organization*, 59 (3): 785-800.
- Nielson, D. and MJ Tierney. 2006. "Principals and Interests: Agency Theory and Multilateral Development Bank Lending," Working Paper.
- Pollack, M. 2003. *The Engines of European Integration: Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the EU*. Oxford University Press.
- Rupp, Richard. 2006. "High Hopes and Limited Prospects: Washington's Security and Nation-Building Aims in Afghanistan." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 19, 2: 285-298.

- Strøm, Kaare. 2000. "Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies." *European Journal of Political Research*, 37, 3: 261-289.
- Stulberg, A. 2005. "Managing Military Transformations: Agency, Culture, and the U.S. Carrier Revolution." *Security Studies*, 14, 3: 489-528.
- Thompson, Alex. 2006. "Screening Power: International Organizations as Informative Agents." in Hawkins et al. *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*, Cambridge University Press.
- Voeten, Eric. 2005. "The Political Origins of the UN Security Council's Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force." *International Organization*, 59, 3: 527-557.
- Williamsson, O. 1975. *Markets and Hierarchies, Analysis and Antitrust Implications: A Study in the Economics of Internal Organization*. New York: Free Press.
- Zegart, AB. 1999. *Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Zegart, AB. 2005. "September 11 and the Adaptation Failure of U.S. Intelligence Agencies," *International Security*, 29 (4): 78-111